

## Canada's whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan: Implications on Development and Peace-building

### Introduction

Canada's 'integrated' 3D, or whole-of-government, approach encompassing development, diplomacy, defence (and sometime other departments) in Afghanistan has had adverse effects on development assistance and peace-building. In effect, this approach has elevated the military component to the neglect of development and diplomatic efforts. Worse still, the integrated whole-of-government approach has served to militarize peace-building and humanitarian and development assistance. This is a fundamental flaw in 3D or whole-of-government approaches, and it has serious implications on the ground for the delivery of aid and prospects for peace.

The last two years have seen an increasing shift towards putting security first, on the assumption that development will follow<sup>1</sup>. Security is indeed important, but cannot come at the expense of development and diplomatic efforts. Indeed, the way in which we are currently pursuing security efforts is hampering the effective delivery of aid, progress in development assistance and, therefore, prospects for peace.

The four options the government presents to the panel for review reveal how the whole-of-government approach fails to give adequate attention to humanitarian, development, and diplomatic considerations. A military effort alone cannot guarantee security.

This paper will explore some of the practical constraints of the 'full integration' whole-of-government approach on development and peace-building in Afghanistan<sup>2</sup>. It will also make the case for a fundamental re-orientation of Canada's role that enables CIDA and DFAIT, as the development and diplomatic arms of Canadian international policy, to play stronger roles in Canada's engagements in Afghanistan. It calls for a co-coordinated approach that clearly differentiates between development, diplomatic, and military functions in policy and in practice.

### Practical challenges of the an integrated whole-of-government approach

#### 1. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Full integration, as evidenced in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams structure, poses one of the largest practical challenges.

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<sup>1</sup> Comparison on 2006 and 2007 Throne Speech statements. 2006: Government will support a more robust diplomatic role for Canada, a stronger military and a more effective use of Canadian aid dollars.

2007: Canadians understand that development and security go hand in hand. Without security, there can be no humanitarian aid, no reconstruction and no democratic development.

<sup>2</sup> For background on the evolution of Canada's whole of government approach in Afghanistan, Sudan and Haiti, see: "Failed States": Canadian Action in Conflict-Affected States: [http://www.ccic.ca/e/002/humanitarian\\_peace.shtml](http://www.ccic.ca/e/002/humanitarian_peace.shtml).

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The first PRTs in Afghanistan were established in December 2002, based on the former US model of Joint Reconstruction Teams. The goal of PRTs is to provide security, to support the central government and to enable reconstruction. PRTs vary in approach depending on the country leading them.

Canada took over the Kandahar PRT in 2005 from the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom. Canada has 330 personnel<sup>3</sup> in the K-PRT, the vast majority of whom are military, leaving a handful of development workers and diplomats. Civilian police and RCMP, as well as some USAID personnel, have also participated in the K-PRT. Because of Canada's role in combat operations in Kandahar, this means that the military is simultaneously engaged in combat and a state-building process through PRT activities.

The military also engages in Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) through the PRTs. These are generally quick reconstruction or infrastructure repair projects by soldiers intended to provide force-protection benefits to the military. Sometimes, these are referred to as 'hearts and minds' initiatives, designed to gain the support of the local population.

From a military perspective, such projects may make good sense. They are able to repair or build infrastructure or deliver provisions that help win the support of local populations, and perhaps the additional pay-off of information and tips.

However, this approach actually impedes the ability of civilian humanitarian and development personnel to reach populations. Unarmed civilian aid workers rely on their political and military neutrality to win acceptance by the local community.

In this sense, these two approaches are critically at odds with one another.

The protracted conflict and insecurity in Kandahar and other areas in the south raises the question of how long military personnel can simultaneously engage on both the military and development fronts. At the same time, the longer they continue, the stronger the association between the international military effort and development efforts. In the context of insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare this is tremendously problematic, since the projects built by the military may themselves become targets. Worse, Afghan and international aid workers, and civilians associated with the military, may also become targets. Aid workers who begin operations after the military leaves may also be suspect.

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<sup>3</sup> Rebuilding Afghanistan website, accessed November 25, 2007: <http://www.canada-afghanistan.gc.ca/cip-pic/afghanistan/library/kprt-en.asp>.

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For these reasons, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are indeed controversial. The military believes they provide force-protection benefits integral to the mission. However, there is little documented evidence to suggest that is the case and the efficiency and effectiveness of these projects is also questionable<sup>4</sup>. There are other important questions: How does Canada fund such projects? What are our criteria for such funding?

The primary obligation to protect civilians should not be secondary to the military goal of winning hearts and minds. Soldiers handing out school kits to children is not effective if this association causes harm to them in the end<sup>5</sup>. While the list of K-PRT Projects and Activities on the DND website is full, it remains unclear where funding for K-PRT Projects and Activities come from (CIDA and DFAIT are listed separately), how they are approved, and who within the KPRT is ultimately responsible<sup>6</sup>.

Organizations operating outside Kandahar in the north and north west question the utility of PRTs in such areas, particularly when PRTs are engaged in QIP and development work. Where they do exist, they argue PRTs should focus on security sector reform and disarmament and leave aid to organizations outside the PRT structure. There is also concern that a lack of expertise in programming creates potential for harmful side effects.

Afghan organizations indicate they are not comfortable receiving funding from the PRTs due to targeting and fear of association with the military. They prefer to receive funding from Embassies, NGOs, the U.N. or the government<sup>7</sup>. When PRT teams settle into an area, Afghan organizations say these locations become insecure since the PRTs are targets for the Taliban<sup>8</sup>.

Under exceptional circumstances, when there are no civilian organizations and personnel to deliver aid, the military can be called upon. In such cases, they must respect the humanitarian operating environment. This is firmly recognized in U.N. and Canadian Guidelines that recognize the damage done to humanitarian and development efforts that are too closely associated with political and military efforts<sup>9</sup>. Canada committed itself to these standards in the 2003 Government of Canada Guidelines on Humanitarian Action and Civil-Military Coordination and has a responsibility to ensure they are upheld on the ground as well.

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<sup>4</sup> Humanitarian Policy Group, *Resetting the rules of engagement: Trend and issues in military – humanitarian relation*, March 2006. p. 42 – 47.

<sup>5</sup> As listed under KPRT Projects and Activities, DND website accessed November 25, 2007: [http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/kprt-epk/act\\_e.asp](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/kprt-epk/act_e.asp)

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Phone conversation with a researcher on civil-military relations, report forthcoming.

<sup>8</sup> Correspondence from a CCIC member partner organization in Afghanistan.

<sup>9</sup> See UN Guidelines On the Use of Military and civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief (1994) and Complex Emergencies (2003).

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The key point is that humanitarian aid must be delivered in accordance with international humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, independence, and neutrality.<sup>10</sup> This means that under no circumstances can aid be used as a tool in the pursuit of military objectives. This is true even where the military is engaged in supporting or delivering aid. Aid as a force multiplier is completely inconsistent with these internationally sanctioned norms.

This isn't to pit civilian aid workers against the military presence. It is to emphasize not just *what* we do, but *how* we do it. An approach that integrates humanitarian, development and military efforts, jeopardizes success in all areas. Unclear policy direction plays out in unclear roles on the ground, and poorly supported aid efforts that, in turn, hinder vital progress.

## Recommendations

- Canada should support external objective evaluations of PRT performance and, in particular, their impact on humanitarian and security outcomes and impact on local communities. This will require coordination among donors.
- Specifically, Canada should support an external evaluation of the K-PRT for both effectiveness and impact on the humanitarian operating environment, security, and local communities.
- For the K-PRT, Canada should develop indicators or standards of effectiveness to determine whether it is fulfilling its stated objectives.
- To the greatest extent possible, civilian and military functions in the K-PRT should be separated. Guidelines should be developed and disseminated on the appropriate role of the military within PRTs and for interaction with the local population.
- Ensure that CIDA is not funding QIP projects, since these are fundamentally military projects. If they continue, funds should come from either the DND or DFAIT budget.
- Any support channeled through the PRT by CIDA must be consistent with Official Development Assistance rules of the OECD.
- Canada must make clear its end-strategy for the K-PRT and when roles will be transferred to the relevant local authorities.

## 2. The targeting of aid and aid workers

Canada's (and indeed other donors') integrated, whole-of-government approach has created a close association between the military presence and aid, linking the international aid effort to the international military effort. This blurring of the lines has led to targeting of aid and aid workers.

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<sup>10</sup> *Humanity*: meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found. *Impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations. *Neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out. *Independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented. See The Principles and Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship endorsed by Canada in 2003:  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/ghd/a/%2023%20Principles%20EN-GHD19.10.04%20RED.doc>.

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In Afghanistan, at least 40 aid workers have been killed in this year alone. Seven of these were international staff. The other 34 were Afghans. On top of that, 76 humanitarian workers were abducted (44 national, 25 international). In addition, 55 humanitarian aid convoys and 45 humanitarian facilities were attacked, ambushed or looted by gunmen<sup>11</sup>. Clearly, the majority of victims are Afghans. At the same time, there is an increasing reliance on Afghans to deliver aid because the security situation is so precarious and because internationals are seen as part of the international military effort against the Taliban. Unfortunately, this means an increasing number of Afghans themselves are also targeted for attacks.

The situation is even worse for female Afghan aid workers. In turn, this has had adverse effects on access to aid by the female population, undoubtedly one of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups<sup>12</sup>

The current situation is the worst aid agencies have had to cope with. We are talking of organizations who have been active in Afghanistan for decades, through the Soviet era, the Mujahideen, the Taliban, and even the 2001 ousting of the Taliban by U.S. forces<sup>13</sup>. In almost 30 years of war, only now has the threat to aid workers reached such levels.

Traditionally, the international humanitarian presence has provided two basic services: the first, life saving assistance, the second, witnessing to what is actually happening to vulnerable populations. In Afghanistan, the reduction of international aid staff has meant less witnessing on the ground and increased vulnerability for national staff. This means that the Afghans trying to rebuild their society are the ones being killed and threatened.

Aid workers tend to be targeted for economic and political reasons. This year, 106 criminal and conflict-related incidents have been confirmed against NGOs.<sup>14</sup> Attacks on aid workers have occurred in both the north and south. In the north, the attacks are the work of criminal networks after economic gain and, in the south, by the Taliban and anti-government forces<sup>15</sup>. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), anti-government forces this year have abducted more than 60 NGO workers, compared with 20 by criminal gangs<sup>16</sup>.

Aid worker insecurity threatens access to civilians in dire need in at least two ways. First, because aid workers who are threatened, abducted and killed are simply unable to deliver and support assistance.

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<sup>11</sup> IRIN News, UN warns of humanitarian crisis in inaccessible areas, 29 October 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Discussion with Farida Nekzad, November 13, 2007.

<sup>13</sup> IRN News, ICRC warns of growing humanitarian emergency, 21 October 2007.

<sup>14</sup> IRIN News, NGOs vulnerable to criminal violence and insurgency, 7 November 2007

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

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Second, because aid agencies must be assured of reasonable levels of safety for their staff. The more insecure the situation, and the more aid staff are targeted, the less likely are organizations to continue programming. In both instances, aid may not reach those in need. This has severe repercussions on the country's ability to make vital progress in development.

Some suggest this dire situation requires the military to take up the role of delivering humanitarian and even development assistance. CCIC and its members, including those active on the ground, suggest this will only make a bad situation worse. As argued earlier, integrating military and development efforts in state-building in Afghanistan, turns development organizations into targets.

### **Recommendations**

- Canada must advocate separation of development and military functions. It should discourage statements by the military that link aid efforts to the international military effort. A plethora of images on the Government of Canada website associate soldiers with Afghan children and aid. This, too, should be discouraged.
- Support to the fullest extent the ability of organizations like the ICRC, UN agencies, and NGOs to negotiate humanitarian access to populations in need. This will include negotiations between these entities, the government of Afghanistan and anti-government groups.
- Increase training for Canadian forces on codes of conduct and Guidelines in relation to Civil-Military Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance, including the 2003 Oslo Guidelines and the Government of Canada's Guidelines.
- Pressure the Afghan government to end impunity for attacks against aid workers, whether of the result of rampant criminality or insurgency.
- Increase security-related training in Canada for aid workers operating in conflict zones.
- Support low profile efforts to provide security training to nationally recruited staff.
- Canada should support monitoring and reporting mechanisms, perhaps through the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, on attacks against aid workers and assets, in addition to conflict-related attacks against civilians.

### **3. Placing an emphasis on effective aid**

Poverty in Afghanistan is about inequality of access to assets and social services, poor health and nutrition, limited access to education, displacement, vulnerability to natural disasters such as floods and drought, gender inequities, conflict, and political marginalization. Development is a multi-faceted and complex endeavour which takes time. While short- to medium-term progress can be measured by the number of facilities built and services provided (as just one example), real successes in eradicating poverty in a country like Afghanistan will take decades. And this will only be possible if concerted efforts are maintained well past 2011.

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Yet, initially our development assistance was minimal as compared with our military efforts. Between January 2002 and July 2003, CIDA contributed \$ 26 million to Afghan Transitional Administration through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, the United Nation's Mine Action Program and civil-military cooperation projects.<sup>17</sup>

The next phase of funding, announced in March 2004, was for \$250 million between 2005 and 2009 for a Security Sector Reform Fund, the Microfinance Investment and Support Facility (MISFA), and support for the National Solidarity Program<sup>18</sup>. CIDA disbursements between March 2004 and March 2007 totalled \$285 million<sup>19</sup>.

That means between 2002 and March 2007, CIDA spent \$311 million on Afghanistan programming. In 2007, Canada committed another \$200 million with a total pledge of \$1.2 billion between 2001 and 2011. The government is now under pressure to remedy its lagging commitments to development, once simply an after-thought to the military commitment.

Canada must ensure it now delivers on its pledges. But money alone, while important, will not solve the challenge of poverty and inadequate development in Afghanistan. We need to address the reasons why aid is not reaching Afghans as effectively as it should if we are to make progress. The low priority on development assistance has been one of those reasons.

Different approaches by different donors is another major challenge. Some donors fund through the core budget, others through the external budget<sup>20</sup>. Peace Dividend Trust estimates that only about 31% of aid is spent on Afghan goods and services, as opposed to foreign goods and services. This is largely the result of major donors like the U.S. and Germany channelling funding through foreign organizations and contractors<sup>21</sup>. This severely limits the beneficial local impact of assistance.

In September of 2007, a review of CIDA's current project browser suggested about 15% of current CIDA projects specifically target Kandahar Province<sup>22</sup>. According to DND, 20% target Kandahar Province. The U.S spends more than half of its budget on the four most insecure provinces<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> Canada's Development Commitment for Afghanistan' CIDA, July 2005, accessed at:

<http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/cidaweb/acdicida.nsf/En/JOS-426165819-SLH>. Cited in Patrick Travers and Taylor Owen, *Peacebuilding While Peacemaking: The Merits of a 3D Approach in Afghanistan*, The University of Oxford, 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Government of Canada, Performance and Knowledge Management Branch, *Review of the Afghanistan Program*, May 2007.

<sup>20</sup> 2007 National Human Development Report pg. 31.

<sup>21</sup> See Too few development dollars are actually spent in Afghanistan, Andrew Mayeda and Mike Blanchfield, *Ottawa Citizen*, 23 November 2007, and the 2007 National Human Development Report pg. 31.

<sup>22</sup> According to CCIC calculations for current project funded by CIDA, see:

<sup>23</sup> Afghanistan aid must be spread, *Financial Times*, 19 March 2007.

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The U.K. allocates one fifth of its budget to the south<sup>24</sup>. The U.N. and NGOs on the ground are increasingly concerned that aid is being diverted disproportionately to insecure areas<sup>25</sup>. The U.N. has stated that development actors' failure to ensure less strategically useful provinces in the north and west receive a peace dividend accentuates the north-south fault-line enhancing tensions in the country. Perceptions are rising in the north that the poppy-growing areas in the south are treated preferentially by donors because they receive more assistance for poppy alternatives<sup>26</sup>.

CIDA is under pressure to demonstrate development results in the south, but we urge, that media and other pressures do not become the basis for allocation of much needed resources in Afghanistan. Humanitarian and development aid should be need-driven, not be used to win over the support of populations in strategic areas. Working with other donors to meet needs across the country should be a priority for Canada. Even the most effective Canadian aid will not have substantial impact if other donors do not also adopt such an approach. The annual donor conference on development is one possible avenue to achieve this.

CIDA has invested a large proportion of resources in pooled or multi-donor Trust Funds, such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), and the National Solidarity Program (NSP). A review of CIDA's project browser suggests Trust Funds receive a majority of CIDA funding, followed by Multilateral organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank, the UNDP, WFP, and WB. A significantly smaller amount is channelled to NGOs, the ICRC and to the CIDA-PRT. Small amounts are channelled directly through the government, and a small Embassy Fund<sup>27</sup>. Precise numbers are hard to determine due to multi-year allocations, but in terms of direct impact, this suggests CIDA could do more to support community-based work through international and Afghan civil society. CIDA could also ensure the effectiveness of the pooled funding mechanism by supporting regular evaluations.

The same information suggests disarmament and mine action receive the most support followed by counter-narcotics (non-eradication approaches), education and literacy, including for girls, livelihoods, including alternative livelihoods, reconstruction of roads and buildings, health, food aid, legal sector, IDP and retuning refugees, gender equality support, and human rights treaty reporting<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> See the 2007 National Human Development Report, Oxfam International Overview of Priorities for Canada in Afghanistan, November 2007 and Afghanistan Reference Group Statement of Development and Humanitarian Assistance, November 2007.

<sup>26</sup> United Nations, Report of the Secretary General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, 21 September 2007, par. 24.

<sup>27</sup> See CCIC backgrounder on aid in Afghanistan.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.



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Assessing these areas against core poverty reduction needs and conflict-induced complications in Afghanistan, we conclude that much more needs to be done in the area of strengthening human rights, and more direct support to IDPs, the health sector, and livelihoods.

Interestingly, there is no indication of support for youth-centred programming, particularly in the area of youth employment and vocational training. Given that 41% of Afghanistan's population is fourteen years of age or under, this area needs more attention. Again, civil society organizations could play a more active role in targeted programming.

In general, channelling funding through civil society organizations would have greater impact. While strengthening the government is important, much more needs to be done simultaneously to support Afghan civil society, including women's groups and networks. Canadian organizations are well positioned to do this.

## **Recommendations**

- Support evaluations for the ARTF, MISFA, and the NSP and other pooled funds through which CIDA channels funds for their effectiveness and impact in providing development benefits.
- Press other donors to invest more directly in Afghan resources to increase the overall local impact of aid.
- Develop indicators for aid effectiveness in Afghanistan along with other donors.
- Emphasize support for civil society, including more funding to support Afghan civil society. This will increase direct benefits to the population.
- Increase funding for gap areas: youth, disabled, and agriculture.
- Support rolling needs assessment throughout the country to ensure total donor resources are allocated according to need.
- Increase CIDA's annual budget progressively to meet the 0.7% of our GNI within 10 years. This would help ensure that support to Afghanistan will not detract from pressing needs in other parts of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa.

## **4. Peace-building and support for peace processes**

As with development and humanitarian assistance, peace-building in Afghanistan has become increasingly militarized. Indeed, many conflate the military effort with a peace-building effort. Terminology often confounds this confusion. Peace-building can generally be described as activities that address the root causes of conflict, as well as the consequences of conflict. Some examples include conflict-sensitive development, peace education, dialogue and conflict resolution, transitional justice, de-mining, and human rights strengthening. Depending on the activity, this can be supported by CIDA or DFAIT.

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A review of our aid commitments suggests that there is no CIDA or Government of Canada strategy or framework in place to support peace-building in Afghanistan. In other war-affected countries, efforts are made to make sure development avoids exacerbating conflict and tensions in society. For example, as previously mentioned, perceptions that the south receives more assistance feed the north-south conflict divide.

CIDA should support conflict assessments for development work in Afghanistan, including the development of conflict-sensitive frameworks and evaluations. Practically speaking, this means increased support for activities that support dialogue and inter-tribal or communal peace-building. It means support for curriculum in schools, peace education, working with minority communities, and supporting human rights and an end to impunity.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade can also play a much stronger role in supporting peace-building efforts in Afghanistan. This could include support for developing parliamentary mechanisms for conflict resolution, support for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and human rights monitoring in Afghanistan, security sector reform, and transitional justice, including supporting renewal of the Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation and Justice (APPRJ)<sup>29</sup>.

Canada should also investigate all possibilities for supporting formal and/or informal peace processes. Canada should invest along with the Afghan government and other donors in an assessment of what may be possible and most effective in Afghanistan. More wars today are stopped by negotiated settlements than by military victory<sup>30</sup>. In 2006, 2 conflicts ended, 7 were in full peace processes, and 27 were in interrupted or semi-processes<sup>31</sup>. However, to date, despite 30 years of war, concerted efforts to support a peace process in Afghanistan have been elusive. Past efforts by the U.N. in the 1990s were overshadowed by the Gulf War.

As the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated at an Annual Retreat of Mediators in June 2007: "Dialogue is a viable tool".<sup>32</sup> Any such support for a peace process must include a role for Afghan civil society, including a meaningful role for women. Culture and religion are clearly factors in effectively involving women in such processes, but they should not be allowed to be an impediment to such involvement.

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<sup>29</sup> For more on Transitional Justice, see IRIN News: Revitalise transitional justice system - UN human rights commissioner, 21 November 2007.

<sup>30</sup> Charting the roads to peace: facts, figures and trends in conflict resolution, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, October 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, Beyond the boiling point: Is dialogue a viable tool in Afghanistan? Oslo Forum, June 2007.

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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security obligated states to ensure that women are indeed involved in the design, negotiation, and implementation phases of any peace agreement<sup>33</sup>. Canada has been a 1325 champion for years, including supporting Afghan-Canadian women's roundtables in 2002<sup>34</sup>. As such, Canada should do more to support the effective participation of women in any peace process in Afghanistan.

Negotiations with the Taliban must take into account the perspectives of the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and other minority communities, as well as the Pashtun community, and their legitimate concerns -- a mediation process must explicitly include mechanisms to account for their views.

As with any peace process, the challenge is managing or determining the extent to which former and current belligerents, including those responsible for human rights violations, are treated. This is a process of social negotiations that occurs between those affected by war. Accountability to the people that have suffered the brunt of conflict must be a priority. This is done by ensuring justice mechanisms are sufficiently addressed, discouraging blanket amnesty clauses, having strong weapons control provisions, backed up by a strong international commitment and monitoring of implementation.

Peace processes are not a silver bullet, nor are they easy. Follow-up on part of the international community to ensure robust implementation in these areas is necessary if a re-lapse to war is to be avoided.

## **Recommendations**

- Canada must dramatically boost its diplomatic efforts. A first step is to become a tireless advocate for a comprehensive peace process to build the political consensus now absent.
- Canada should support an assessment in partnership with the UN, other donors, and the Afghan government and civil society to determine who may be best positioned to support a sustained peace effort.
- Canada can also provide technical and financial resources to facilitate initiatives and to ensure that Afghan women and civil society have the resources to participate effectively.
- Canadian civil society has a role to play in supporting grass-roots community-based peace-building through community development initiatives.
- Support the development of national political and social institutions capable of mediating conflict without resort to violence.

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<sup>33</sup> For more on Resolution 1325 see the Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group:  
[http://www.peacebuild.ca/upload/fact\\_sheet\\_new.pdf](http://www.peacebuild.ca/upload/fact_sheet_new.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> see A STONE IN THE WATER, Report of the Roundtables with Afghan-Canadian Women On the Question of the Application UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in Afghanistan, July 2002 and

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- Canada must champion the involvement of women in design, negotiation, and implementation phases.
- Internally, DFAIT must dramatically increase its mediation and negotiations support capacity.
- Non-partisan political support in Canada is required to support such a process. Lessons from Norway and elsewhere demonstrate that if Canada is to become involved in supporting a peace process, there must be a political consensus and commitment in Canada to support long-term efforts at peace in Afghanistan.

## Conclusion

The time is now for Canada to dramatically re-orient its role in Afghanistan to place a much greater emphasis on political negotiations, community peace-building, effective development assistance and humanitarian aid. To do so, it will have to re-evaluate how the whole-of-government approach has succeeded and failed in Afghanistan. We urge Canada to re-consider the 'full integration' approach in light of its negative impact on the ground and, instead, support a coordinated approach that recognizes and maintains the distinctions between development, diplomacy, and defense, in policy and practice. Most importantly, Canada must place diplomacy and development and humanitarian access at the front of its efforts.

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## Suggested Further Reading:

- Afghanistan Reference Group submission to the Independent Panel on Humanitarian and Development assistance (forthcoming).
- Afghanistan Reference Group submission to the Independent Panel on Peace and Security (forthcoming).
- Ernie Regehr, *Failed States and the Limits to Force: The Challenge of Afghanistan in Fragile States or Failing Development?* Canadian Development report 2008, The North-South Institute.
- Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, *Canada's Contribution to Gender Equity in Afghanistan*, in *Fragile States or Failing Development?* Canadian Development report 2008, The North-South Institute.

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