Announcer: The United States may have initially led the coalition of forces that ended up in Afghanistan, but Canada's role has become increasingly important, helping rebuild the country and helping rebuild the government too.

But the unusually close relationship between Canada and Afghanistan is raising some eyebrows. Tonight senior correspondent Brian Stewart goes inside the mission once again to bring to light the details of a little known Canadian contingent with a lot of influence.

Brian Stewart: In Afghanistan's capital Kabul, Canada wields influence in subtle even shadowy ways. A visitor is hard pressed to find a flag or a poster even suggesting Canada's presence.

Here some of the most influential Canadian advisors, especially those from military ranks, cling to dimly lit back rooms, shunning attention.

Man 1: We do not go to any social functions or anything of that regard, to embassies or anything like that. We do not want to be seen. We need to plead impartiality with everything we do. So we don't want to get caught in that game whatsoever.

Brian: That 'game' is the inside maneuvering for position in a city where two dozen major donor nations want influence and want intelligence.

But Canada's 'softly, softly' approach fools few in diplomatic or political circles. For here Canada is very much seen as an influential player. At $120 million per year, it's the third largest donor nation.

Some in parliament, itself partially designed and equipped by Canada, even question if Canadians have gathered too much influence in top offices of government. It is well known in Kabul that Canada remains one of the most trusted international backers of President Hamid Karzai's regime.

Moreover, it is widely believed that Canada's top General, Rick Hillier, has had unique influence with Karzai for years. And that Hillier, even now, as Chief of the Defense Staff, keeps remarkably close tabs on the Kabul government.

The most extraordinary proof of this tight relationship is a still little known Canadian military operation called SAT-A, or Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan. This has embedded more than 15 Canadian Officer/Advisors in some of the highest ranks of the Karzai government, an access no other allied nation has.

Sometimes jokingly called 'The Hillier Gang' these officers help plan and help execute key government recovery efforts - rural development, civil service reform, even the most crucial sector of all, the National Development Strategy. What's unique in this is no military operation before has actually embedded itself within a host nation's governing circles.

Search for the very heart of the Afghan recovery effort and you find it in this modest building in Kabul, inside here, the so-called 'War Room'. This coordinates the whole National Development Strategy, oversees the efforts of all departments trying to revive the shattered nation.

Afghans and other officials work here but overseeing the whole flow of information from government department to department is a Canadian Chief Advisor for the sector, Colonel Bernie Darable.

Colonel Darable: It's absolutely brand-new. It's something that we've never taken part in before. It is true nation building, which is the key. We are truly here to do nation building.

This particular team, the SAT team, is not here in a military you see me dressed like this we're not here to do anything advising the military. We are strictly here to advise and mentor the leadership, and assist in mentoring possibly the next generation of leadership.

Brian: But the access these 15 Canadians have is resented by some in the diplomatic and military community, who wonder how Canadians have the most sensitive insights, denied to even the U.S. and British Embassies.

How do you avoid being seen as power brokers behind the scenes or political influence gatherers?

Colonel Darable: We're lucky because we're Canadians for starters. We're looked at as neutral right off the bat. I'm not 100% sure that in my six months that I've been here so far, that if I was an American or possibly British, that I would have had the same effect. There would be that concern.

Brian: SAT officers have privy to extraordinary inside information where the billions in development funds are going, which arm of government is trustworthy, which isn't. To remain insiders they refuse to report anything even to the NATO mission called ISAF.

Colonel Darable: When I will go to meetings at the U.N. Headquarters or maybe ISAF Headquarters, I do so as a group of others. There's a reason for that. I would never want to go there on my own or be seen to be gathering any kind of information. What happens in here stays in here. What happens at ISAF if I was ever to be felt to be going between, I'm sure I would be persona non grata and rightly so.

Brian: When he headed the NATO ISAF mission in Kabul three years ago, Hillier was seen by allies as a highly imaginative General. His often blustery image obscures a keen military academic mind.

Hillier also had extensive service in the Balkans. In both countries he saw the need for a new 'Operational Art', as he termed it - the use of soldiers posted inside government to shape overall political strategy and turning military power into domestic power.

General Hillier: One of the things we always saw was a lack of capacity for a government in those newly formed countries or countries that had been destroyed. They had a lack of capacity to govern themselves. Usually people had left the country and fled the fighting. A lot of them were killed and so you had no skill sets, no characteristics, no ability to plan a vision or a strategy, which lots of people have, through to a policy, to turn it into a plan, and then help implement that plan.

Brian Stewart: So unconventional was his approach, many in NATO, including the U.S., wondered if Hillier had set up his own military foreign affairs network, even intelligence service, a suspicion which still lingers in a few circles.

Then Colonel Mike Capstick was one of the first organizers of SAT, and recalls the suspicion of Canada's motives.

Colonel Capstick: You know, you put a team of 15 Canadian military officers into the government, concentrated in two groups, so that's fairly significant resources, working in a couple of offices. Maybe some people thought that Canada had the typical hidden agenda that people worry about or whatever.

Brian: But some circles of Foreign Affairs Ottawa and CIDA have also been uncomfortable with the so-called 'Hillier Gang', particularly as SAT is a military structure which reports directly thought the military command to General Hillier himself.

Foreign Affairs and CIDA are only consulted on occasion, where the military sees fit.

Colonel Capstick: There were some people both in the Foreign Service and in CIDA that again were suspicious because it's an odd thing, a very unconventional thing for military officers to do.

Brian: But opposition to the Strategic Advisory Team was quickly quashed by Karzai himself. Shortly after Hillier was appointed Chief of the Defense Staff, he was asked by Karzai to send more senior Canadian military advisors who would teach Afghan officials how to plan and think strategically to implement the big plans.

Man: Provide this opportunity to work and make our lives better.

Colonel Capstick: We teach men and women how to plan at the strategic level, at a very tactical level and how to link those two levels in order to allow the implementation of a vision down the road. So we do a lot of preparation. I don't think there is another organization that does that. That's the valuable characteristic that we bring here.

Brian: So valued are the Canadian SAT officials that they were asked along with then Canadian Ambassador Chris Alexander and CIDA to draw up the dropped framework for the historic Afghan Compact signed last year in London and later reinforced by the United Nations - The 42 Steps to Progress for National Recovery, steps overseen daily by Canadian Colonel Bernie Darable of SAT.

Colonel Darable: This room actually serves, like I said, a mini-operational center for the Afghan Compact. There are 42 benchmarks, broken down into three pillars, into Security, Governance. For our means, you've got Pillar Managers who are responsible for the benchmarks that are in there with respect to that. They are the almost liaison officers, to coin a military term, between all the respective ministries.

Brian: Again, in keeping the Canadian team so close to him, President Karzai appears to lack easy trust with the U.S. and other allies.

Captain Capstick: It was surprising to me early on how much it meant to the President and to the other officials in the government of Afghanistan, that this was a bilateral Canadian/Afghan operation and that we were not part of either the U.S Coalition or the NATO International Security Assistance Force that it was Canadian to Afghan.

I attribute that a lot to the reputation that Canada built up early on in the mission.

Brian: It quickly becomes clear in Kabul, however, that another key reason for the Canadian influence is its willingness to stay in the background, ensuring the Afghan government gets full credit here for any success a way to build more Afghan capacity and Karzai's credibility.

General Hillier: The psyche of the Afghan people has been damaged. They know that there have been difficulties here. The last thing we want to do is essentially rub their face in it. Say well we'll tell them how to plan or fight. No. Here's the money. You build it.

Brian: Such discretion occasionally flies in the face of demand of the Canadian Parliament and public for proof of Canadian Aid success and signs of influence. Most Canadian aid, in fact $.5 billion worth so far is funneled into the Afghan government, reappearing as Afghan government works.

General Hillier: We don't need to get great credit out of this one. The credit will be at the end of the mission once Afghanistan is ready to stand on its own here. So, we don't need, in the short term to be shouting about what is some very good work.

The Afghans are working very hard. This is their country. There are taking the risk. And we're quite willing to let them take credit for the work that they do obviously.

Brian: In recent months, NATO has appeared anxious to somewhat limit Canada's insider role. One position in Karzai's office was recently dropped. Senior Afghan leaders however, still insist some help in planning and training is invaluable, especially on the overall Afghan National Development Strategy, headed by Adib Fahardi.

Adib Fahardi: It's great that they've been assisting us for a long time now and I think they have been great. We get a new sense of this and this is just another sign of the close relationship Canadians have with us which gives a good perception and obviously there is a good bilateral relationship and it's a good way of strengthening that relationship.

Brian: Finally, though praised, the SAT operation is high risk. Canadian officers have embedded themselves in a deeply troubled, fractious government, one frequently accused of serious corruption.

Should Karzai fail, and Afghanistan founder, Canadian efforts could be much criticized. That doesn't stop defenders who argue everything in Afghanistan is high risk. And the riskiest thing of all would be to stand back and ignore appeals for help.

Brian Stewart, CBC News.