

# THE SENLIS COUNCIL

Security and Development Policy Group

## Policy Paper

# Canada in Afghanistan: Charting a New Course to Complete the Mission



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## Recommendations to the Canadian Government

### I. Recommendation on articulation of Canada's mission in Afghanistan

#### **Chart a new course to successfully complete Canada's mission in Afghanistan**

To complete its mission to bring sustainable peace and prosperity to Afghanistan, Canada must chart a new strategic course. As such, Canada must clearly articulate its overall mission goal in Afghanistan, and identify coherent critical success factors to ensure accountability in the process leading to the achievement of this goal.

### II. Recommendations on Canada's specific goals in Kandahar

#### **Provide immediate food aid and health care to Kandahar's population to support military's stabilisation mission**

Southern Afghanistan urgently needs an injection of financial aid earmarked for the short-term relief of conditions of extreme poverty in which many people live. To win back the hearts and minds of Kandahar's local population, Canada must work to decrease civilian casualties of war, and address the minimum needs of the civilians affected by conflict, poppy eradication and drought. This can be achieved through the immediate provision of mobile field hospitals for the emergency treatment of injured civilians, by funding the renovation of Kandahar's hospital, and through the distribution of sufficient food and shelter supplies to the inhabitants of Kandahar's refugee camps.

#### **Prioritise economic development as the solution to opium crisis: Implement Poppy for Medicine Pilot Project to trigger local economic diversification**

US plans for chemical poppy eradication must be immediately halted. In charge of stabilisation efforts in Kandahar, Canada bears the responsibility for the consequences of this 'chemical warfare', including the possibility of losing Kandahar to the Taliban. To fully test the capacity of village-based poppy for medicine projects to trigger sustainable economic diversification, Canada should support the implementation in Kandahar of scientific pilot projects in the next planting season.

#### **Focus on achievement of Millennium Development Goals to lay foundation for mission success**

Without addressing Afghanistan's extreme poverty, achieving sustainable peace and prosperity will be impossible. The Millennium Development Goals represent internationally successful responses to many of the issues lying at the heart of ongoing instability in Kandahar. The successful achievement of these Goals in Kandahar will lay the foundation for Canadian mission success in Afghanistan.

### **Concentrate on promoting human rights**

In carrying out its mission in Afghanistan, Canada should draw on its extensive heritage of contributing to the development of international humanitarian law, and ensure that all of Canada's policies and actions in the country provide a positive example to the Afghan population and institutions.

## **III. Recommendations on overhauling Canada's development, aid and counter-narcotics infrastructure to achieve success in Afghanistan**

### **Appoint a Special Envoy to coordinate Canada's efforts in Afghanistan**

The CIDA Minister should be relieved of the responsibility to provide development in Kandahar. The appointment of a special envoy will enable the war-zone coordination and optimisation of Canada's development, diplomatic and military, and civilian volunteer resources to achieve Canada's mission objective.

### **Match military spending with development spending to reflect importance of Afghanistan as Canada's top foreign policy endeavour**

The optimisation of Canada's development efforts in support of its military efforts will require significant increases in the delivery of humanitarian aid and development. Canada must raise its annual development spending from \$139 million to match its military spending of \$1,416 million, and provide the Canadian embassy with the resources necessary to reflect the top priority Afghanistan represents to Canada's foreign policy.

### **Empower Canadians to assist in bringing prosperity to Afghanistan**

The Canadian government should facilitate the deployment of Canadian volunteer experts to help bring sustainable prosperity to Afghanistan. Enabling assistance programmes and professional exchanges between Canadians and Afghans will not only increase mutual understanding, it will also empower Canadians to provide direct support to communities in Kandahar, enhancing Afghanistan's potential for prosperity.



*Senlis Afghanistan field research interview, southern Afghanistan, February 2007*

## Executive Summary

### ***Clear articulation of Canada's goals in Afghanistan needed***

As articulated in numerous United Nations Security Council Resolutions, peace and stability in Canada and the rest of the world is clearly linked to bringing lasting peace and prosperity to Afghanistan. Despite its recognition that Afghanistan represents Canada's most important current foreign policy endeavour, the Canadian government has failed to make a clear, objective argument to the Canadian public for Canada's efforts in Afghanistan. This failure has seriously compromised the Canadian government's capacity to set the policies necessary to achieve success in Afghanistan, and is risking public support for the Afghanistan mission.

### ***Current ineffective development efforts compromising Canadian troops***

Canada's military is doing its job and winning the battles in Kandahar, but Canada's development and counter-narcotics failures are losing the war in Afghanistan. Canada's incoherent development strategy is failing to address even the basic needs of Kandahar's people, and this failure is increasing support for the insurgency. Nearly 50% of men in southern Afghanistan believe the Taliban will defeat NATO and Afghan troops. As the hub of the Taliban movement, Kandahar is of totemic importance for the future stability of Afghanistan. Losing Kandahar to the insurgents would further decrease support for the Afghan government and could represent the beginning of the end for the international community's capacity to assist the Afghan people.

### ***Dramatic change of course urgently needed to chart path to mission success***

It is clear that for Canada to succeed in Afghanistan, a dramatic change in direction is needed. The Canadian government must chart a new course with clear, achievable targets that address southern Afghanistan's on the ground realities. Specific measures of success will enable Canada to make steady progress towards the achievement of the international community's overall mission objective to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.

### ***Clear measures of success will promote steady progress towards overall goal***

A clear path to achieving the steady progress necessary to sustain support for Canada's mission lies in addressing Afghan communities' legitimate grievances by providing immediate access to food aid and health care. Canada must respond to the looming disaster of US-led counter-narcotics policies with economic development-based counter-narcotics strategies, and follow the Millennium Development goals to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and prosperity in Afghanistan.

### ***Complete overhaul of development infrastructure necessary***

To support the implementation of this necessary new course towards mission completion, the Canadian government will need to completely overhaul its development, aid and counter-narcotics infrastructure. A new strategy and structure is needed to both ensure that Canada's development efforts complement those of its

military, and to provide an influx of the human and financial resources necessary to achieve mission success.

***Canada should stay in Afghanistan until mission objective achieved***

Canada must stay in Afghanistan until the mission to bring lasting peace and prosperity to Afghanistan is complete. Canada must fulfil its commitment, as articulated in the United Nations Resolutions, to help the people of Afghanistan bring to an end the tragic conflicts in the country, and to promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights, as well preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorism.



*Eight year-old girl in southern Afghanistan. Just CAD \$40 worth of equipment could have protected her airway. This equipment was not available and she died the day after this photo, 27 February 2007.*

## **1. Needed: a clear articulation of Canada's overarching goals in Afghanistan**

### **1.1 What is Canada's objective in Afghanistan?**

Canada's overarching goal in Afghanistan is the same as that of the international community, as articulated in the United Nations Security Council's multiple resolutions on Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> Following the tragic events of 11 September 2001, Canadians went to Afghanistan to help the country establish lasting peace and prosperity, to thereby avoid any future extremism and instability both in and stemming from Afghanistan. Peace and stability in Canada and the rest of the world is clearly linked to bringing lasting peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.

Yet despite recognising that "Afghanistan represents Canada's most important foreign policy endeavour,"<sup>2</sup> the Canadian government has failed to make a clear, objective argument to the Canadian public for Canada's efforts in Afghanistan. Not only is this failure to engage in a real conversation risking public support for the Afghanistan mission, it is putting at risk the entire international community's mission to bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan.

### **1.2 Failure to articulate clear goals compromising mission success**

It is clear that this failure to clearly articulate Canada's mission in Afghanistan has seriously compromised the Canadian government's capacity to set the policies necessary to achieve success in Afghanistan. Currently, it appears that Canada has no clear and articulate plan for bringing peace and prosperity to Kandahar province, the region in which Canada is concentrating most of its resources.

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<sup>1</sup> In particular, the United Nations' Security Council resolution 1383, adopted on 6 December 2001, stressed the member states' determination "to help the people of Afghanistan bring to an end the tragic conflicts in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights, as well as to cooperate with the international community to put an end to the use of Afghanistan as a base for terrorism;" and called on all donors to "strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan." This resolution built on the Security Council's earlier resolution 1378, adopted on 14 November 2001, which emphasised the urgency of the security and political situation in Afghanistan and called on all member states to provide both quick impact projects to build support for the new Afghan governmental leaders, and long-term assistance for the social and economic reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Harper, quoted in "Harper drops in on Afghanistan", by Paul Koring, *The Globe and Mail*, 22 May 2007, [online] Available at: [http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070522.wharperkoring0522\\_1/BNStory/International](http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070522.wharperkoring0522_1/BNStory/International)

The lack of clear measures of success has resulted in extremely limited achievements that either the Canadian public or Afghan public can see. Despite Prime Minister Harper's acknowledgement that Afghanistan's future will not be secured through military means alone,<sup>3</sup> the limited progress towards peace and prosperity in Kandahar indicates that the leadership and policies from the Canadian government necessary to coherently coordinate Canada's diplomatic, development, and military efforts in the country are missing.

### **1.3 Development, aid, and counter-narcotics policies failing to complement military efforts**

Canada's development, aid and counter-narcotics strategies remain incoherent and limited in their capacity to impact positively on even the basic needs of Kandahar's people. Canada is still spending over ten times more on security and military projects than it does on humanitarian aid and development.<sup>4</sup> Kandahar's refugee camps are growing steadily, and its hospital is dilapidated and filthy, with no heat in the winter, and no air conditioning in the summer.<sup>5</sup> There is no functioning food aid distribution system, and legal money-making opportunities remain extremely limited.

Senlis Council field research has found that the significant imbalance between Canada's military and development efforts is seriously undermining Canada's military successes. The failure to demonstrably address the extreme poverty, widespread hunger, and appalling child and maternal mortality rates in Afghanistan - let alone boost economic development - is decreasing local Afghan support for Canada's mission and increasing support for the insurgency.<sup>6</sup>

This failure of Canada's development, aid and counter-narcotics efforts to support the efforts of the international troops operating in the region is not only undermining the Afghan government, it is compromising the entire Canadian mission and the international community's primary objective preventing the return of extremism to the

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> According to figures from Canada's Department of National Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency, for the 2006-2007 financial year, CAD \$1,416 million was spent on military and security operations, compared to just \$139 million on development programmes. See Department of National Defence, National Defence 2006-2007 Plans and Priorities, [online] Available at: [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp06-07/RPP06-07\\_e.pdf](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp06-07/RPP06-07_e.pdf); and Canadian International Development Agency, Afghanistan Development Resources and Results 2006-2007: \$139, [online] Available at:

[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Afghanistan/\\$file/Results-May-10.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Afghanistan/$file/Results-May-10.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> The Senlis Council, "Case Study: War Zone Hospitals in Afghanistan: A Symbol of Wilful Neglect," February 2007.

<sup>6</sup> The Senlis Council, "Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies", February 2007.



region.<sup>7</sup> A recent field survey found that a full 49% of men in southern Afghanistan believe the international troops will lose the fight against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.<sup>8</sup> As the hub of the Taliban movement, Kandahar is of totemic importance for the future stability of Afghanistan. Losing Kandahar to the insurgents would further decrease support for the Afghan government and could represent the beginning of the end for the international community's capacity to assist the Afghan people.

#### **1.4 Major course correction needed for Canada to successfully complete its Afghanistan mission**

In assisting the international community to avert future extremism and regional instability, Canada has the opportunity to once again influence important international humanitarian legal instruments. Through its mission in Afghanistan, Canada can lead the development of practical, on the ground economic-based nation-building solutions, which could have wider positive implications for post-conflict regions around the world. However, it is clear that for Canada to succeed in Afghanistan, a dramatic change in direction is needed. The Canadian government must chart a new course with policies that reflect the reality on the ground in southern Afghanistan.



*Waiting for food aid in Kandahar's Panjwai desert camp*

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<sup>7</sup> The Senlis Council has been monitoring the security and development situation in Afghanistan for more than two years now, and ongoing field research indicates that Afghans are growing increasingly disillusioned with the international troops they welcomed with open arms five years earlier. A March 2007 Rapid Assessment Survey of Afghans' perceptions found that over 80% of men aged 16 and over in southern Afghanistan do not believe that the international troops are working in Kandahar to help them. See Senlis Afghanistan, *On a Knife Edge: Rapid Assessment Field Survey of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan*, March 2007.

<sup>8</sup> For further discussion of the findings in this Senlis Afghanistan report "On a Knife Edge: Rapid Assessment Field Survey of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan," see Appendix I.

## 2. Charting mission goals and critical success factors

### 2.1 Goal: stabilise Kandahar

To support the Canadian military's efforts to stabilise the region, new policies are needed which set clear measures of success and reflect Kandahar's on-the-ground realities. To stabilise Kandahar, the Canadian government's primary goal should be to ensure that its development, aid, counter-narcotics, diplomatic and military policies are clearly articulated and implemented in balanced, coordinated ways to immediately respond to locals' legitimate grievances and thereby demonstrably impact on the key reasons behind the ongoing instability in the region.

#### ***Failure to respond to legitimate grievances increasing support for insurgency***

Canada and the international community must listen and respond to the legitimate grievances related to the impoverishment of rural communities, poppy eradication operations and civilian casualties. The implementation by Canada of practical, basic development strategies to generate measurable positive changes in the lives of ordinary Afghans would go a long way towards winning back the hearts and minds of Kandahar's population, and in doing so, would provide the necessary support to NATO-ISAF's efforts to defeat the insurgency.

The extensive use of aerial bombing, often as compensation for the limited number of troops on the ground, has triggered further deterioration of local support. Canada's leadership within NATO-ISAF and the international community can help to decrease the number of civilian casualties of war. Canada's military is doing more than its share of the work in southern Afghanistan. Using this as leverage, Canada is in an ideal position to compel other NATO members to increase their national commitments to ISAF to decrease reliance on aerial bombings.

→ ***Critical success factor: decrease in number of civilian casualties***

#### ***Limited availability of health care undermining local support for Canadian mission***

The virtual absence of health care in Kandahar is one of the local populations' chief grievances, and is undermining support for the Canadian mission in Kandahar.<sup>9</sup> Despite five years of international operations in Kandahar and Lashkar Gah, the hospitals remain in a state of complete decay. Kandahar's hospital does not have the resources to stock medication and there is no monitoring equipment in the emergency or intensive care units. Oxygen supply is only available four days out of five and physician and nursing training programs reflect the absence of modern diagnostic and laboratory

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<sup>9</sup> The Senlis Council, "Hearts and Minds in Southern Afghanistan: Zroona Aw Zehnoona," December 2006.

services. The hospital is also filthy and patients suspected of carrying infectious diseases such as Polio are not isolated from other patients.<sup>10</sup>

There are no provisions for the emergency transportation and care of civilian victims of war. Those civilians caught in cross fire or injured by explosions and land mines must organise their own transportation to a hospital which can provide only the most rudimentary of care for them if they arrive. Fully aware of the medical technology available to members of the international community operating in the Afghanistan, the people of Kandahar are too often condemned to watching their family members die or suffer permanent disabilities.

It is clear that the current system of medical aid in Kandahar is dysfunctional and inadequate to address the minimum needs of the civilian casualties of war, poppy eradication and drought. To win the hearts and minds of local populations, Canada can immediately address the desperate need for better health care in southern Afghanistan by providing mobile field hospitals for emergency treatment to civilians injured in military operations, and by providing for the renovation of Kandahar's hospital.

→ ***Critical success factors: field hospitals immediately in place and the Kandahar hospital brought up to standard within six month***

A recent field survey found that over 80% of Afghans in southern Afghanistan worry about feeding their families.<sup>11</sup> Canada can impact on this figure through the immediate distribution of food aid, particularly to those displaced persons living in Kandahar's refugee camps, and through the establishment of food-for-work programs.

→ ***Critical success factor: adequate shelter and sufficient food available to all inhabitants of Kandahar's refugee camps***

## **2.2 Goal: diverse economy providing legal income-generating opportunities**

Lying at the nexus of Afghanistan's security and development crises, the current forced eradication-based counter-narcotics policies being implemented in Afghanistan are critically undermining the Canadian military's efforts to stabilise Kandahar.<sup>12</sup> Given that

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<sup>10</sup> The Senlis Council, "Case Study: War Zone Hospitals in Afghanistan: A Symbol of Wilful Neglect," February 2007.

<sup>11</sup> The Senlis Council, "On a Knife Edge: Rapid Assessment Field Survey in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan", March 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Poppy eradication alone does not work and is counter-productive: field research has found that forced eradication is fuelling violence and insecurity, particularly in southern Afghanistan. The Senlis Council, "Impact Assessment of Crop Eradication in Afghanistan and Lessons Learned from Latin America and South East Asia," January 2006; "Afghanistan Five Years Later: The Return of the Taliban", September 2006; "Countering the Insurgency in Afghanistan: Losing Friends and Making Enemies", February 2007.

the United States'-led counter-narcotics strategies are fuelling instability and failing to provide Afghan farmers with access to the resources and assets necessary to phase out illegal poppy cultivation, the Canadian government must support the Afghan government and strongly oppose the United States' efforts to carry out chemical spraying eradication operations.

→ ***Critical success factors: cancellation of all chemical spraying operations, and postponement of all forced eradication until sustainable livelihoods are available***

Instead, the Canadian Government can support the implementation of a proven economic development-based counter-narcotics strategy which would foster the diversification of rural Afghan communities' money-making opportunities necessary to phase out Afghan farmers' economic reliance on illegal poppy cultivation, and would cut these communities' links with drug traffickers. This counter-narcotics initiative is poppy for medicine projects.<sup>13</sup> Similar projects were implemented in Turkey in the 1970s with the support of the United States and the United Nations, as a means of breaking farmers' ties to the international illegal heroin market without resorting to forced poppy crop eradication. Within just four years, this strategy successfully brought the country's illegal poppy crisis under control.<sup>14</sup> Rather than ignoring counter-narcotics policies, Canada's should concentrate on promoting economic development as the international community's chief counter-narcotics strategy for Afghanistan.

→ ***Critical success factor: pilot project implemented in Kandahar next planting season***

Current counter-narcotics policies are also contributing to the growing poverty crisis in Afghanistan and the increasing dissatisfaction with the central government and international community in Afghanistan. Drought and bombing have added strife to an existing discontent and suffering. Survey results show that 80% of the population of southern Afghanistan now worries about feeding their families. A recent field survey found that on average, men in southern Afghanistan are able to find paid work just seventeen days out of each month. For those days in which paid work is available, these men earn just USD \$3 per day.<sup>15</sup>

These legal incomes available to men in southern Afghanistan compare unfavorably with the monthly USD \$200-600 the Taliban is now offering. If the Canadian government were to match its development and aid spending (\$139 million in 2006-

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<sup>13</sup> Poppy for Medicine projects involve licensing the controlled cultivation of poppy to produce essential poppy-based medicines such as morphine, and unlicensed poppy cultivation remains a criminal activity.

<sup>14</sup> The Senlis Council, "The Political History of Turkey's Opium Licensing System for the Production of Medicines: Lessons for Afghanistan," May 2006.

<sup>15</sup> The Senlis Council, "On a Knife Edge: Rapid Assessment Field Survey in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan", March 2007.

07<sup>16</sup>) to that of its military spending (\$1,416 in 2006-07<sup>17</sup>), effective employment training programmes and meaningful jobs could be created. By increasing its development spending, the Canadian Government can prioritise the reduction of the proportion of Afghan men and women living in extreme poverty as both a military and a humanitarian imperative. Canada's goal should be to decrease current and potential support for the insurgents.

→ **Critical success factor: increase in income levels**

### **2.3 Goal: achieve the Millennium Development Goals**

In 2000 the United Nations' member states, including Canada, adopted eight Millennium Development Goals with the aim of ending extreme poverty. These Goals set out clear objectives for achieving progress towards specific poverty indicators such as halving the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day, halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger, and reducing the under-five child mortality rate by two thirds.

Currently, Afghanistan belongs to a small group of countries, the rest of which are from Africa, which are "either more than a generation off track or going backwards" in terms of being able to reach their Millennium Development Goals.<sup>18</sup> Afghanistan is the only Asian country to have not met or to be on track to meet more than two of the Goals, and it is severely off track to meet at least four of the Goals.<sup>19</sup> Yet the achievement of the targets encapsulated in these internationally agreed upon goals would ensure that Afghanistan makes sustainable measurable progress towards achieving the peace and prosperity necessary for Canada to complete its mission in the country.

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<sup>16</sup> Canadian International Development Agency, Afghanistan Development Resources and Results 2006-2007: \$139, [online] Available at:

[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Afghanistan/\\$file/Results-May-10.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Afghanistan/$file/Results-May-10.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Department of National Defence, National Defence 2006-2007 Plans and Priorities, [online] Available at: [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp06-07/RPP06-07\\_e.pdf](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp06-07/RPP06-07_e.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Development Programme, 'Human Development Report', New York, 2004 [online] Available at: <http://hdr.undp.org>

<sup>19</sup> Farrington J. 'Growth and Poverty in Asia: Where Next?' Working Paper 267, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2006 [online] Available at: [http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working\\_papers/wp267.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp267.pdf)

## United Nations Millennium Development Goals<sup>20</sup>

- 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**
  - Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day
  - Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
- 2. Achieve universal primary education**
  - Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day
  - Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
- 3. Promote gender equality and empower women**
  - Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015
- 4. Reduce child mortality**
  - Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five
- 5. Improve maternal health**
  - Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio
- 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**
  - Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
  - Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
- 7. Ensure environmental sustainability**
  - Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources
  - Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water
  - Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020
- 8. Develop a global partnership for development**
  - Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory, includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction— nationally and internationally
  - Address the least developed countries' special needs. This includes tariff- and quota-free access for their exports; enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction
  - Address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States
  - Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems through national and international measures to make debt sustainable in the long term
  - In cooperation with the developing countries, develop decent and productive work for youth
  - In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries
  - In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies— especially information and communications technologies

Specifically, Canada can concentrate its development and human resources in Afghanistan on achieving the relatively straightforward Millennium Development Goals of reducing by two thirds the child mortality rate. Currently, twenty-five percent of Afghan children do not live to the age of five. This can be compared to the child

<sup>20</sup> A full articulation of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals is available online at: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/goals.html>  
See Appendix II for the targets and indicators associated with these goals.

mortality rate in OECD countries which is one in two hundred.<sup>21</sup> Starvation, infection, dehydration, and trauma are some of the causes of death for these children. As such, the remedies are inexpensive and straight-forward to implement. Canada can easily and immediately contribute to reducing Kandahar's child mortality rate by increasing access to clean, potable water, and providing for the implementation of simple hygiene instruction programs as well as soap. The reduction of child mortality rates in Kandahar is easily attainable and would result in recognition by Afghan parents of the effectiveness and competence of Canada's presence in their communities.

→ ***Critical success factor: decreased child mortality rates***

In his 2001 statement to the Afghan Women's Summit for Democracy in Afghanistan, the then United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan proclaimed that "there cannot be true peace and recovery in Afghanistan without a restoration of the rights of women."<sup>22</sup> One of these rights is the right to health. Another Millennium Development Goal, towards which Canada can significantly contribute, is the improvement of maternal health in Kandahar. Currently, Afghanistan has one of the worst maternal mortality rates in the world. Only 14% of births are attended by skilled personnel and 1,900 out of every 100,000 die in child birth.<sup>23</sup> Canada can demonstrate leadership in the inexpensive training of local women to provide midwifery service to their communities. This would immediately reduce the maternal mortality rate and have the additional benefit of providing employment opportunities to women.

→ ***Critical success factor: decrease maternal mortality rates***

## **2.4 Goal: universal respect for human rights**

According to Canada's Prime Minister, Canadians "carry the light of freedom and democracy of human rights and the rule of law," and the country's mission in Afghanistan represents "Canada at its best."<sup>24</sup> Canada is renowned for its expertise in human rights and capacity to influence the positive development of international humanitarian law. To strengthen the foundation for sustainable peace and security in Afghanistan, in Kandahar, Canada can support the implementation of the rule of law and enhance respect for human rights in Afghanistan by incorporating the expertise of qualified, interested Canadians in specific media and governance training programmes.

→ ***Critical success factor: genuine freedom of speech and rule of law***

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<sup>21</sup> WHO, Mortality Country Fact Sheet 2006, [online] Available at:

[http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort\\_emro\\_afg\\_afghanistan.pdf](http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort_emro_afg_afghanistan.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> Kofi Annan, quoted in UN Press Release SG/SM/806 "True Afghan Peace not possible without restoration of women's rights' says Secretary-General in message to Brussels summit", 14 December 2001, [online] Available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm8066.doc.htm>

<sup>23</sup> WHO, Mortality Country Fact Sheet 2006, [online] Available at:

[http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort\\_emro\\_afg\\_afghanistan.pdf](http://www.who.int/whosis/mort/profiles/mort_emro_afg_afghanistan.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Stephen Harper, quoted in Mike Blanchfield, "Canada undaunted by Taliban's shadow: Harper", CanWest News Service, 23 May 2007, [online] Available at:

<http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=0bcbb7c7-6e2a-4211-a572-414ac60c2742>

### **3. Overhaul Canadian development, aid and counter-narcotics infrastructure to achieve critical success factors**

#### **3.1 Special Envoy needed to coordinate Canada's efforts in Afghanistan**

The extremely limited results achieved by Canada's International Development Agency in Kandahar to date demonstrate the incapacity of the agency to operate effectively in a war zone. Given that these limited achievements are undermining Canadian military efforts and compromising the likelihood of mission success, a new strategy is urgently needed to ensure that Canada's humanitarian aid and development efforts actually contribute towards bringing sustainable peace and prosperity to Afghanistan. By relieving the Minister for CIDA of the responsibility for development, aid and counter-narcotics strategies in Kandahar, a special qualified envoy would be in an ideal position to coordinate Canada's aid and development efforts. Responsible for, and authorised to maximise Canada's development, diplomatic, military, and civilian volunteer resources, a special envoy would enhance Canada's capacity to achieve measurable progress towards its overall mission objective in Afghanistan.

#### **3.2 Match development spending to military spending to reflect importance of Afghanistan as Canada's top foreign policy endeavour**

To ensure that Canada's development, aid and counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan best support and complement its military efforts, the Special Envoy will need access to an expanded humanitarian aid budget. Not only should Canada's development, aid and counter-narcotics spending increase from \$139 million<sup>25</sup> to match that of its annual military spending of \$1,416,<sup>26</sup> the resources available to Canada's Afghanistan embassy should increase to reflect the top priority Afghanistan represents to Canada's foreign policy.

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<sup>25</sup> Canadian International Development Agency, Afghanistan Development Resources and Results 2006-2007: \$139, [online] Available at:

[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Afghanistan/\\$file/Results-May-10.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Afghanistan/$file/Results-May-10.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> Department of National Defence, National Defence 2006-2007 Plans and Priorities, [online] Available at: [http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp06-07/RPP06-07\\_e.pdf](http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/dgsp/00native/rep-pub/ddm/rpp/rpp06-07/RPP06-07_e.pdf);



### 3.3 Empowering Canadian citizens to assist Afghans

Capitalising on the extensive interest Canadians have for Afghanistan, a special envoy would be in the ideal position to coordinate the efforts of Canadian individuals and aid organisations to assist in the Afghan reconstruction and development process. The newly appointed special enjoy can establish an Emergency Task Force of Canadian citizens, to immediately contribute towards Canada's efforts to impact positively on education, human rights, women's rights and health in Kandahar.



*Bed-ridden for three months, basic re-hydration restored this woman's capacity to care for her family. Kandahar City camp, March 2007.*

#### 4. How long should Canada stay in Afghanistan?

Canada must stay in Afghanistan until the mission to bring lasting peace and prosperity to Afghanistan is complete. Canada must fulfil its commitment, as articulated in the United Nations Resolutions, to help the people of Afghanistan bring to an end the tragic conflicts in the country, and to promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights, as well preventing Afghanistan from being used as a base for terrorism.



*This three year-old boy has been permanently disabled by starvation. Kandahar's Mirwais Hospital, March 2007*

## Appendices

<b>Appendix I. Local perceptions of the situation in southern Afghanistan</b>	<b>20</b>
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## Appendix I. Local perceptions of the situation in southern Afghanistan


### Extremely alarming results found across southern and eastern Afghanistan

Across the south, the majority of survey respondents both worry about being able to feed their families, and do not believe that the international troops are helping them. Afghans in southern Afghanistan are increasingly prepared to admit their support for the Taliban, and the belief that the international community will not be able to defeat the Taliban is widespread in the southern provinces.

### Loss of confidence in the international community's ability to defeat the Taliban

Afghans are losing confidence in the international community. Nearly half of all those surveyed (49%) now believe that the international community will lose the war in southern Afghanistan. To put this startling figure in perspective, at the end of 2001 the majority of Afghans and the international community strongly believed that the Taliban had been totally defeated.

Five years on, nearly half think International troops will not defeat the Taliban to win the war. This is even more alarming when considered in light of the fact that over a quarter of the Afghan population now supports the Taliban. With the Taliban increasingly being seen as the winning side, it is likely that support for them will increase.




**Limited perceived support from international community**

The presence of international forces in Afghanistan does not appear to have had any positive impact on the lives of the local population. The vast majority – 80% – of Afghans surveyed found that the presence of international troops have not helped them, either in terms of their personal security or the improvement of living standards. Only a minority of 20% surveyed found that the presence of international community in Afghanistan has helped them in any way.

After millions of dollars in aid money pledged and spent since the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, the vast majority of the Afghan population has not felt an improvement in their lives resulting from the presence of the international community in the country, neither from a security nor a humanitarian perspective. Instead, the security situation has steadily worsened and an alarming number of people are living in extreme poverty, with nothing to eat.

**Counter-narcotics policies intensifying widespread food insecurity**

Current counter-narcotics policies are also contributing to the growing poverty crisis in Afghanistan and the increasing dissatisfaction with the central government and international community in Afghanistan. Drought and bombing have added strife to an existing discontent and suffering. Survey results show that 80% of the population of southern Afghanistan now worries about feeding their families



Field research shows that the root causes of the current insurgency in Afghanistan are mainly economic in nature. This is especially true at the grassroots level, where the

insurgency in Afghanistan seems to have little to do with Al Qaeda or the global Jihad, but more with being able to feed one’s family. This economic reality makes it relatively easy for the Taliban to increase both its support and recruitment base. Compared to other professions, Taliban fighters earn very high salaries. Jobs in the army or in the police force pay at least three or four times less, while the risks in Helmand and Kandahar provinces are similar. A significant proportion of young Afghan men informally interviewed admitted their intent to cross the Pakistani border to look for any available work.

Respondent to the Kandahar and Helmand survey stated an average yearly income of 37,350 Afghanis (USD 747). This yearly figure is not even as high as the bimonthly earnings of a Taliban fighter.

<b>Rapid Assessment Field Survey Kandahar and Helmand economic data averages</b>					
	Daily earnings		Number of days worked per month	Yearly income	
	AFN	USD		AFN	USD
Survey-wide average	156	3.11	17.11	37,350	747

## Appendix II: Millennium Development Goals, targets and indicators

The internationally agreed framework of 8 goals and 18 targets was complemented by 48 technical indicators to measure progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. These indicators have since been adopted by a consensus of experts from the United Nations, IMF, OECD and the World Bank.

Each indicator below is linked to millennium data series as well as to background series related to the target in question.

### Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty

**Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day**

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#### Indicators

2. Proportion of population below \$1 (1993 PPP) per day (World Bank)<sup>27</sup>
3. Poverty gap ratio [incidence x depth of poverty] (World Bank)
4. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption (World Bank)

▪ **Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger**

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#### Indicators

5. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age (UNICEF-WHO)
6. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (FAO)

### Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

**Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling**

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#### Indicators

7. Net enrolment ratio in primary education (UNESCO)
8. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 (UNESCO)<sup>28</sup>
9. Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds (UNESCO)

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<sup>27</sup> For monitoring country poverty trends, indicators based on national poverty lines should be used, where available.

<sup>28</sup> An alternative indicator under development is "primary completion rate".

### **Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women**

**Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015**

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#### Indicators

10. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education (UNESCO)
11. Ratio of literate women to men, 15-24 years old (UNESCO)
12. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector (ILO)
13. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (IPU)

### **Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality**

**Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate**

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#### Indicators

14. Under-five mortality rate (UNICEF-WHO)
15. Infant mortality rate (UNICEF-WHO)
16. Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against measles (UNICEF-WHO)

### **Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health**

**Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio**

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#### Indicators

17. Maternal mortality ratio (UNICEF-WHO)
18. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (UNICEF-WHO)

### **Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases**

**Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS**

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#### Indicators

19. HIV prevalence among pregnant women aged 15-24 years (UNAIDS-WHO-UNICEF)



20. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate (UN Population Division)<sup>29</sup>
- 19a. Condom use at last high-risk sex (UNICEF-WHO)
- 19b. Percentage of population aged 15-24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (UNICEF-WHO)<sup>30</sup>
- 19c. Contraceptive prevalence rate (UN Population Division)
21. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 years (UNICEF-UNAIDS-WHO)

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**Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases**

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Indicators

22. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria (WHO)
23. Proportion of population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures (UNICEF-WHO)<sup>31</sup>
24. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis (WHO)
25. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under DOTS (internationally recommended TB control strategy) (WHO)

**Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability**

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**Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources**

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Indicators

26. Proportion of land area covered by forest (FAO)
27. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area (UNEP-WCMC)
28. Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per \$1 GDP (PPP) (IEA, World Bank)

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<sup>29</sup> Among contraceptive methods, only condoms are effective in preventing HIV transmission. Since the condom use rate is only measured amongst women in union, it is supplemented by an indicator on condom use in high-risk situations (indicator 19a) and an indicator on HIV/AIDS knowledge (indicator 19b). Indicator 19c (contraceptive prevalence rate) is also useful in tracking progress in other health, gender and poverty goals.

<sup>30</sup> This indicator is defined as the percentage of population aged 15-24 who correctly identify the two major ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV (using condoms and limiting sex to one faithful, uninfected partner), who reject the two most common local misconceptions about HIV transmission, and who know that a healthy-looking person can transmit HIV. However, since there are currently not a sufficient number of surveys to be able to calculate the indicator as defined above, UNICEF, in collaboration with UNAIDS and WHO, produced two proxy indicators that represent two components of the actual indicator. They are the following: (a) percentage of women and men 15-24 who know that a person can protect herself from HIV infection by "consistent use of condom"; (b) percentage of women and men 15-24 who know a healthy-looking person can transmit HIV.

<sup>31</sup> Prevention to be measured by the percentage of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bednets; treatment to be measured by percentage of children under 5 who are appropriately treated.

- 29. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (UNFCCC, UNSD) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP tons) (UNEP-Ozone Secretariat)
- 30. Proportion of population using solid fuels (WHO)

**Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation**

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Indicators

- 31. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural (UNICEF-WHO)
- 32. Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural (UNICEF-WHO)

**Target 11: Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers**

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Indicators

- 33. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (UN-HABITAT)

**Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development**

**Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system (includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction, both nationally and internationally)**

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**Target 13: Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries (includes tariff- and quota-free access for Least Developed Countries? exports, enhanced program of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries [HIPCs] and cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction)**

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**Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states (through the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and 22nd General Assembly provisions)**

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**Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term**

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Indicators

### **Official development assistance (ODA)**

34. Net ODA, total and to LDCs, as percentage of OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors' gross national income (GNI)(OECD)
35. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) (OECD)
36. Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied (OECD)
37. ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their GNIs (OECD)
38. ODA received in small island developing States as proportion of their GNIs (OECD)

### **Market access**

39. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and from LDCs, admitted free of duty (UNCTAD, WTO, WB)
40. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries (UNCTAD, WTO, WB)
41. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as percentage of their GDP (OECD)
42. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity (OECD, WTO)

### **Debt sustainability**

43. Total number of countries that have reached their Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative) (IMF - World Bank)
44. Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative (IMF-World Bank)
45. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services (IMF-World Bank)
46. Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately for the least developed countries, Africa, landlocked developing countries, and small island developing states

## **Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth**

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### Indicators

47. Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years, each sex and total (ILO)<sup>32</sup>

## **Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries**

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### Indicators

48. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis (WHO)

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<sup>32</sup> An improved measure of the target for future years is under development by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

**Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies**

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Indicators

- 49. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population (ITU)
- 50. Personal computers in use per 100 population and Internet users per 100 population (ITU)



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### **About The Senlis Council**

*Established in 2002, The Senlis Council is an international security and development think tank with offices in Europe, Canada, and Asia. The Council provides comments and new ideas on strategic issues like international counter narcotics, security and development. Over the past two years, the Council has established extensive policy and field operations in Afghanistan. It has offices in Helmand, Kabul and Kandahar.*

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