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3350-165/A29 (COS Sp)

13 July 2007

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**BOI MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS – A-10A FRIENDLY FIRE  
INCIDENT 4 SEPTEMBER 2006, PANJWAYI DISTRICT, AFGHANISTAN**

1. On-going review of the subject minutes, as part of the preparation for public release, has identified a potential source of confusion in the document. Throughout the document, the term TACP is used both to describe a specific doctrinal construct, and as a generic term to imply the inherent TACP capabilities of close air support planning and coordination. Confusion arises from the fact that, during the deployment timeframe in question, there was a close air support planning and coordination capability in place, but it was not called a TACP nor was it structured exactly as prescribed in NATO doctrine. Since the Report actually provides a definition based on the doctrinal TACP construct, at paragraph 162 (fact 6), it is important to clarify where the term TACP is inaccurately used in reference to the generic capability and not the doctrinal TACP entity. These observations in no way affect the findings and recommendations of the Board.

2. Instances of the second, generic use of the term occur as follows.

a. The primary paragraph of concern is paragraph 6 of the Executive Summary, which states that the Brigade and Battle Group TACPs were not properly manned, and that the Bde HQ trained in Canada with a complete TACP but did not deploy it. This leaves the incorrect impression that TACPs were an established element of the Task Force, and that a conscious decision was made to hold the Bde TACP in Canada, and not fully man the deployed BG TACP. During pre-deployment training, and at the time of the incident, formed doctrinal TACPs were not part of the Task Force TO&E and thus could not be characterized as under-manned and similarly were not used for any pre-deployment training. At that time, the air execution and planning functions were assigned to other offices within the Task Force, particularly the Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC) and the Task Force J3 Air. BOI paragraphs 249 and 250 correctly refer to this.

b. Paragraph 54 refers to the TF-K TACP, which, as stated above did not exist, although the TACP responsibilities were carried out by other individuals.

c. Paragraphs 164 and 165 acknowledge that TACP was not provided for in the TO&E, but parts of either paragraph, taken out of context of the first sentence, might lead to the wrong interpretation. Paragraphs 168 and 169 are similarly open to misinterpretation.

1/2



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d. Paragraph 238 makes the statement that there were deficiencies in the TACP manning; this is again incorrect, for the reasons described in sub-paragraph a above.

e. The recommendations presented at paragraphs 376 and 377 also refer to TACP however, placed in the context of the information at paragraphs 249 and 250, the potential for misinterpretation is unlikely.

3. With your approval, I will direct that this letter be retained with the BOI in order to clarify and assist in the interpretation of the Board's findings in relation to the TACP issue.

4. To re-iterate, the foregoing is for the purposes of clarification, and has no impact on the validity and appropriateness of the Board's findings and recommendations, nor should it impede the proactive release as scheduled.



J.C.M. Gauthier  
Lieutenant-General

Approved / Not Approved

R. J. Hillier  
General