'The Canadians try to kill everybody'

GRAEME SMITH ventures into the infamously lawless Pakistani province of Baluchistan to meet foot soldiers of the Taliban

Graeme Smith, Globe & Mail, 27 Nov 06

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The two men sat cross-legged on a carpet in a room filled with birdsong and sunshine.

Their hands were soft, their words polite, but their story served as a chilling warning for Canadian soldiers trying to bring peace to Afghanistan's troubled south.

In a rare meeting marked by unusually straight talk, the men described how they manipulate Afghan tribes, turn local officials against their own government and channel the frustrations of ordinary people to drive foreigners away from their ancient lands.

They spoke from personal experience. The two, relaxing at a private home in a secret location in the infamously lawless Pakistani province of Baluchistan, are foot soldiers in the Taliban insurgency.

During the first visit to Baluchistan by a Canadian news media organization since Canada sent troops to nearby Kandahar at the beginning of the year, the midlevel insurgents outlined their ideas about how the Taliban aims to defeat the foreign troops.

With no permission from their superiors to talk with journalists, and fearing the Afghan intelligence agents widely believed to be hunting Taliban in the tribal areas, the two insurgents gave fake names: Mullah Azizullah, 34, and Mullah Manan, 37.

"There is a big difference between Canada and the United States," Mr. Azizullah said, tapping his fingertips together in a pensive gesture.

"If we attack the Canadians, they call for aircraft and bomb everything in the area. The U.S. only tried to kill the Taliban. The Canadians try to kill everybody."

Wearing pinstripe vests, gold watches and neatly trimmed beards, the two men looked different from front-line Taliban fighters encountered near the battlefields of Kandahar.

Like many of their comrades, they were born in the rebellious district of Panjwai -- they boasted about having returned three times to the lush farmland in recent months to lead attacks against the Canadians and their allies. But while many Taliban fighters are simple farmers, rough men with dirt under their fingernails, Mr. Azizullah's nails were trimmed and neatly painted with henna. He spoke a little English, too, and said he had worked as a senior official in the old Taliban regime.

And he showed a distinctly modern flair for sarcasm. "We won't kill you," he told a foreign visitor, with wry smile. "We'll just kidnap you and sell you."

Mr. Azizullah made clear that he watches Afghanistan's political scene carefully. He gave a current example: Burhanuddin Rabbani, Afghanistan's former president and a prominent warlord who now serves as a member of parliament in Kabul, recently told Afghan journalists that his associates are talking to the Taliban, but he didn't give details about the negotiations. Most of the Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns from the country's south and east, and the upsurge of violence this year has been concentrated in those regions, although the Taliban have been searching for ways of opening new fronts in the north. Mr. Rabbani, of the northern Tajik ethnic group, lost his presidency to a Taliban assault a decade ago, but Mr. Azizullah suggested the old commander might now be willing to switch sides.

"Rabbani is talking about an alliance with the Taliban," he said. "This could help us greatly, give us power in the north."

Even without such high-level defections, the Taliban already receive plenty of help from local Afghan officials, according Mr. Azizullah's quiet colleague, Mr. Manan. He confirmed a rumour that ammunition shipped by the government to Ghorak, a remote district northwest of Kandahar, regularly ends up in the hands of the Taliban. Many low-level administrators are willing to trade bullets for guarantees of protection from the insurgents, he said.

"The government officials give us ammunition and money," he said. "Without them, the fight is not possible for us. They help us carry our wounded men back to Pakistan. They give us their own vehicles and uniforms. Nobody can catch us."

Such alliances with local government officials helped the Taliban prepare a suicide bombing against Canadians earlier this year in the village of Bazar-e-Panjwai, Mr. Azizullah said. With a promise that the Taliban wouldn't harm any district officials, he said, some of them helped his insurgents recover an old Russian bomb that landed nearby in the 1980s, but didn't explode. They rewired the detonator and loaded it into a car, and the local authorities tipped off the insurgents about an approaching Canadian convoy. (Mr. Azizullah was vague about the date of the attack, and it's not clear whether any soldiers were killed or injured.)

But co-operation with the Taliban isn't inspired purely by fear, Mr. Azizullah said. Several southern tribes have been marginalized in the new government, making it easy for the insurgents to muster their support.

Four dominant tribes have reaped the largest profits from control of government in the south, he said: the Achakzai, believed to be collecting tariffs from the traffic through their traditional homeland on the Afghan-Pakistan border; the Barakzai, whose tribesman Gul Aga Shirzai served as Kandahar governor for three years after 2001; the Alokozai, a wealthy and populous tribe; and the Popalzai, the tribe of President Hamid Karzai.

"These tribes took Kandahar by force," Mr. Azizullah said. "This is the main reason why we fight."

Many tribesmen from less fortunate branches of the Pashtun ethnic group are also helping the Taliban, he added: the Kakars; the Sakzai; the Tareen; and especially the Noorzai.

"In Kabul, all the government officials are northerners or Popalzai," Mr. Azizullah said. "This is why there are problems. There is no justice."

The frustrations of ordinary people allowed the Taliban to take over parts of the district of Panjwai this summer, until they were routed by a huge North Atlantic Treaty Organization offensive in September, he said. While Canadian and NATO officials say the defeat severely crippled the insurgency, the Taliban said they have learned from that loss. The next wave of insurgents will strike in smaller groups.

In fact, Mr. Azizullah said, the Taliban already have 800 fighters ready to attack their next target. While NATO forces are concentrating their efforts on digging into their newly secured positions in Panjwai, southwest of Kandahar, the foot soldiers described an impending offensive at the other end of the river valley, north of the city in the district of Arghandab.

Similar Taliban claims have proven false on many occasions in recent months; the threats are often part of organized campaigns of intimidation by the insurgents. But Mr. Azizullah offered a detailed argument for attacking Arghandab: "The police are taking a lot of bribes, causing a lot of problems for the common people. People want us to stop this behaviour."

Before taking any action, these Taliban said, the insurgents informed Mullah Naqib, a respected former anti-Soviet commander in Arghandab. He has served as an important ally for Mr. Karzai, and he disagreed with the Taliban's plan to overthrow the local government.

"Naqib told us, 'No, let me talk to the police,' " Mr. Azizullah said. "He promised to fix the situation."

But the paunchy warlord has proven unable to change the political situation to the Taliban's satisfaction, Mr. Azizullah said. He said Mr. Naquib grew frustrated with the local government and has lifted his guarantee of protection from Arghandab's officials. This will allow the Taliban to attack "as soon as possible," he said.

Mr. Naquib could not be reached for comment -- a relative said he's in India for medical treatment.

But Haji Agha Lalai, a member of the provincial council, said the Taliban story is incorrect.

"These are lies," Mr. Lalai said. "The people of Arghandab will fight the Taliban to the death."

The Taliban cabinet

Membership in the Taliban's leadership council, or shura, changes often as factions jostle for power. Information about the shura is closely guarded, too, which makes it difficult to publish an authoritative list. But through several sources, a rough sketch of the Taliban leadership has emerged.

Mullah Mohammed Omar: The one-eyed Taliban leader, who ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, is famously reclusive, and he has been even less visible recently, turning over most of the war-fighting decisions to the top four commanders in the shura: Mullah Dadullah, Akhtar Usmani, Mullah Obaidullah and Amir Khan Muttaqi.

Mullah Dadullah: This notorious commander recently starred in a propaganda film that included bloody scenes of decapitation, and at least one Western intelligence profile has concluded that he's a sadist who enjoys war for its own sake. He is sometimes described as the Taliban's military chief and also described as the leader of suicide-bombing operations. Two sources said that Mr. Dadullah has recently squabbled with colleagues who worry that his tactics are too extreme. He belongs to the Kakar tribe.

Akhtar Usmani: A member of the disgruntled Sakzai tribe from Sangin, a district of Helmand province, this commander is known as a moderate voice in the shura. His rivalry with Mr. Dadullah once led to a physical confrontation in which he was reportedly beaten. Mr. Usmani was once named as the successor to Mr. Omar in the event of his death.

Mullah Obaidullah: The Taliban's former defence minister, he's a member of the powerful Alokozai tribe. He is rumoured to have travelled abroad recently in search of shoulder-fired missiles to defend the insurgents against NATO air power.

Amir Khan Muttaqi: Considered an educated man, Mr. Muttaqi represented the Taliban in UN-led peace talks with northern warlords during the old regime. He is originally from Zabul province, of the nomadic Kuchi tribe.

Mullah Mohammed Hassan Rehmani: The former Taliban governor of Kandahar belongs to the Achakzai tribe.

Mullah Berader: A leaked U.S. intelligence document incorrectly described Mr. Berader as the No. 2 Taliban commander under Mr. Omar, but he remains a prominent figure in the insurgency. His tribesmen, the Popalzai, are loyal to the Afghan government and have distanced themselves from him.

Hafiz Majid: Rumoured to serve as a messenger for Mr. Omar, he belongs to the Noorzai tribe, whose anger against the government has been a major source of instability in Kandahar.

Abdul Razaq: The Taliban's former interior minister, he's a well-known commander of insurgents.

Qudratullah Jamal: Now using the false name Hamid Agha, he served as information minister for the Taliban government and is rumoured to be chief propagandist of the insurgency. He was among the Taliban leaders who successfully pushed for the destruction of ancient Buddha statues at Bamiyan in 2001.

Mullah Abdul Kabir: He served as governor of Nangarhar province in the Taliban government, and remains powerful in the eastern provinces.

Jalaluddin Haqqani: The elderly mujahedeen commander was a favourite proxy warrior for the CIA and Pakistani intelligence against the Russians. His militia now fights alongside the Taliban.